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INTRODUCTION
Appellant Gerald R. Homeyer took over $116,000 from his 97-year old,
incapacitated mother and used about $85,000 of it to buy a house. This left his mother,
Margaret Cannateila, financially destitute and unable to pay for essential nursing care.
According to Mr. Homeyer, his mother desired this outcome. Fortunately, Medicaid was
persuaded by Ms. Cannatella's court-appointed conservator to pay for her nursing care on
the ground that she was essentially the victim of a theft; had she actually given away all
her money, as Mr. Homeyer implausibly claims, under Medicaid regulations she would
not have been entitled to any assistance at all.
The district court ordered Mr. Homeyer to provide an accounting of his mother's
funds and to turn over to her conservator all such funds in his possession. Mr. Homeyer
simply ignored the order. The district court issued an order to show cause why he should
not be held in contempt for failing to provide the accounting and turn over the funds.
Mr. Homeyer appeared at the hearing. A core issue at the hearing was whether
Mr. Homeyer in fact possessed any of his mother's funds: he obviously couldn't be held
in contempt for failing to turn over funds he never had in the first place. The court heard
testimony and took evidence on this point. It was established beyond dispute - the
financial records were clear and Mr. Homeyer admitted it - that Mr. Homeyer took over
$116,000 of his mother's money. Mr. Homeyer claimed his actions were in accordance
with his mother's wishes. But not surprisingly, the district court was unconvinced. Even
assuming Ms. Cannateila had the capacity to consent to Mr. Homeyer taking all of her
money (she didn't), it is utterly implausible that she would consent to leave herself totally
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destitute and without any means to provide for her own care. The district court held
Mr. Homey er in contempt of court and - based on the undisputed evideuce at the hearing
and consistent with its own prior ruling that he turn over all of Ms. Cannatella's funds ruled that Mr. Homey er was liable to Ms. Cannatella's conservator for the converted
monies.
On appeal, Mr. Homeyer claims he was denied due process at the contempt
hearing. However, Mr. Homeyer waived this issue by not raising it in the trial court.
Although at the hearing Mr. Homeyer appeared pro se, he was still required to bring his
due process concerns to the attention of the trial court. He failed to do so. Mr. Homeyer
never objected, even in laymen's terms, to any part of the hearing, and certainly didn't
lodge a formal due process objection. Later, Mr. Homeyer retained competent legal
counsel (now appellate counsel), who filed a Rule 60(b) motion based on the very due
process issue presented on appeal. But Mr. Homeyer withdrew this motion before the
conservator could file an opposition and before the court could address it. Thus, the due
process issue was never brought to the attention of the district court. Absent
extraordinary circumstances, which are not present here, the law is clear that
Mr. Homeyer cannot raise this issue for the first time on appeal.
In any event, Mr. Homeyer received all the process he was due. The contempt
hearing addressed whether Mr. Homeyer had converted his mother's funds because
resolving that issue was necessary - or at least appropriate - for determining whether he
should be held in contempt for not turning over such funds. That was by no means a
violation of due process.
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ADOPTIQN BY

REFERENCE

Appellee S»agg & Ass-oemf^,, ennservator for Margaret Cannatella (hereafter "the
Conservator") fully concurs in Mr. Homeyer's jurisdictional statement and concurs in his
statement of controlling constitutional/statutory provisions with one exiep:

.t ,• ...

as tlie Tifth Aiiicndiiienit In tin I Imilnl Mitte-i Cinislniilinii dues imul jippi 10 the states, it
does not have any bearing on this appeal. The relevant federal constitutional provision is
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
In I he context of a contempt hearing, was Mr. Homeyer denied due process when
the district court took evidence and ruled that he had improperly converted his mother's
funds, where resolving that issue was necessar, u> tied i mine w hdher In dmiild he held
it i coi itei i lpt for failii lg to ti in i o v c: i si id 1 fi 11 ids?

. •

Failure to Preserve Issue/Standard of Review. As set forth below,
Mr. Homeyer failed to raise this issue in the trial court and thus it has nol been propelly
preseixed for appeal Aeeordiiie'ly llns ( 'oiirt\ review is untjri ibe onerous "plain error"
standard, which requires that "an error must be obvious and harmful." Heslop v. Bank of
Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 839 (Utah 1992).
STATEMENT OF 1 HE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
The district court ordered Mr. Homeyer to provide an accounting oi Ins mother's

funds and to turn sue , i ......

-

»nservat*»r I Ir 11 merer i Mused rind

ill-, disii iei eouii1 issued an order to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of
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court. At the contempt hearing, the district court took evidence and heard testimony
concerning funds that Mr. Homeyer admittedly took from his mother but had not
returned. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court held Mr. Homeyer in
contempt. It also ruled, based on clear and convincing evidence, that Mr. Homeyer is
liable to the Conservator for the conversion of all funds taken from his mother during a
specified period. On appeal, Mr. Homeyer argues that the district court violated his due
process rights by addressing issues that allegedly went beyond the scope of the contempt
hearing. The Conservator maintains that Mr. Homeyer waived this issue by not raising it
in the district court and, in any event, that the issues addressed at the hearing were well
within the scope of the contempt proceeding.
B.

Course of Proceedings.1
On January 6, 2004, ElderCare Consult, Inc. ("ElderCare") and Appellee Stagg &

Associates, PC, petitioned the Third District Court for an order appointing ElderCare as
guardian and Stagg & Associates as the Conservator for Margaret Cannatella, an
incapacitated person. R. 1-3. The case was assigned to Judge Leslie A. Lewis and
Probate Judge Paul A. Maughan. R. 1. After proper notice (R. 4-16), on January 28,
2004, Probate Judge Maughan held a hearing at which Mr. Homeyer objected to the
petition. R. 17; 185 at 2-6 (transcript). Accordingly, Judge Maughan referred the
petition to Judge Lewis for resolution. R. 17. On April 15, 2004, Judge Lewis held a
1

In Homeyer's Statement of the Case, which serves as his statement of the course of
proceedings, Homeyer lists proceedings from another case. See Brief of Appellant ("Brf.
Applt"), at 2-4. Those proceedings may be relevant to the substantive issues in this case,
but they are technically not part of the course of proceedings of this case and therefore
will not be included in the following statement. To the extent relevant, such proceedings
will be noted in the Statement of Facts below.
4

hearing on the petition and appointed EiderCare and Stagg & Associates as guai diai 1 ai id
COJ iser\ ator, respectiv ely R 33 36; 186 at 11 8
On May 13, 2004, the Conservator filed a motion for an order requiring
Mr. Homeyer to provide an accounting of Ms. Cannatella's funds for the period of

in his possession or under his control. R. 41-43. Mr. Homeyer was served with the
motion and (proposed) order via mail or M~v 1 2 ? 2004 (R. 44 S .. out nc d^.

]

e any

objection or response.
Mi I lomeyer to provide the accounting and to turn over Ms. Cannatella's funds. R. 5153. Although the order provided that Mr. Homeyer could be served by mail (R. 52), the
Conservator had Mr. Ilomeyer personally serv, J
(

*:*'•" ! - '• d verified motion for an order to show

cause why Mr. Homeyer should not be held in contempt of the court's June 9 order
(R. 57-61), a copy of which was served on Mr. Homeyer that same da\

R, o I i )m

July 21, 200 1 , til: i = :oi n I: ei ai ited 1:1 le ordei tc • show cai lse and se t a hearii ig date :)f
August 10, 2004. R. 67-oS. .vir. Homeyer was personally served via constable with the
order to show cause on July 29, 2004, R, 67.
i

On Augi ist 11. 2004 z the disti ict coi irt 1 leld a I: i : ai ii ig on i the oi dei to show cai ise,
which Mr. Homeyer attended. R. 70-71; 187 (transcript). At the hearing, the Court took
documentary evidence and heard testimony regarding Mr. Homeyer's failure to provide
an accounting and hi» L U I U R In hum M U I In. i n u t l i c f s l u t u h

I'

nl

I" \/)ciu.'<

The

The Conservator and Mr. Homeyer appeared on August 10, .004. but because Judge
Lewis was ill the hearing was contimled to the following day
5

court then held Mr. Homeyer in contempt and ordered him to serve 30 days in jail. R. 70;
187 at 51. On September 23, 2004, the court entered its finding of facts and conclusions
of law. R. 73-80. On the same day, the court also entered an Order and Judgment against
Mr. Homeyer in the amount of $116,181.26, representing the total amount of
Ms. Cannatella's funds he had converted, while allowing for an offset for any funds he
had spent on Ms. Cannatella's behalf. R. 81-82.
On October 22, 2004, Mr. Homeyer filed his notice of appeal. R. 102-03.
Mr. Homeyer's appeal pertains solely to the due process issue; he does not challenge the
correctness of the contempt sanction.
C.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Background.

The background of this case is not essential to the due process issue presented on
appeal, but it does provide a helpful context.3
Margaret Cannatella is approximately 97 years old and incapacitated. R. 16, 76.4
According to a January 27, 2004 letter from her doctor, Ms. Cannatella has "breast
cancer, which her family has elected not to treat, adult onset diabetes, hypertension,
osteoarthritis, osteoporosis, and dementia, which is currently at a severe stage." R. 16.
Moreover, she "is unable to understand her medical or financial condition", "has no

3

Some of the following background is taken from statements Homeyer made at various
court hearings. To the extent relied on herein, those statements are assumed true only for
purposes of this appeal.
4
There is some disagreement in the record about Ms. Cannatella's age, with her doctor
putting it at 93 as of January 2004 and her son, Mr. Homeyer, putting it at 97. The record
appears to use the 97 figure more often and thus it will be used in this brief.
6

ability to understand any interventions necessary for |licr| conditions , 'is eiitnvl) unable
•'

"

w n i . " R. 16.

As explained below , on April 20, 2004, the district court appointed an independent
guardian and conservator for Ms. Cannatella. Before then, apparently beginning around

general power of attorney and had a significant role in directing her care. R. 72, Exhibit
6 (power of attorney).
Sometime after 2001,1"\ Ii I lomeyer placed 1 lis i i lotl lei ii :t ai I assisted cai * facility
called Regency \ ssisted I Ivlii

"

"Regency"), where she enjoyed her own

apartment and some degree of independence. R. 186 ai 11. In about 2002, while trying
to get out of bed, Ms. Cannatella fell and broke he
ai id tt ic

••

...

- * ,., required major surgery
* **

*

*-v|

after the surgery, Mr. Homeyer placed his mother in Christus St. Joseph s \ ?
("St. Joseph's") for rehabilitative care. R 186 at 12 Although K Is. Cannatella was about
97 I \Ii I Ionics LI Jill Iiuftal Jin \ uul I n/onci qdtikh md h\ able to y\* \xu k In 1'L
assisted living facility where she could again be independent and where the care was far
less expensive, R 186 at 12.
\V hen I\ "Is. Cam latella's i eco\ er> did i lot go as 1 ic desh c cl, I \ Ii I lome> er blaii led
Si loseph's. 1 Ic alleged that Ms. Cannatella's rehabilitation program was inadequate first too rigorous with insufficient pain medication; then too lax with too much
medication - and that as a result she became wheelchair bound. I;! 185 at 4; 186 at ] 2.
?"* • Ii , I lomeyer alsc coi i iplaii ieci becai ise a doctor at St Joseph's allegedly recommended a

•

•'

•

.

•

'

;

radical mastectomy to treat her breast cancer, whereas another doctor at Cottonwood
Hospital had recommended against it. R. 186 at 15. (Mr. Homeyer elected not to treat
his mother's cancer. R. 16.) He also complained about the high cost of the care at
St. Joseph's; indeed, he accused St. Joseph's of attempting to "plunder" his mother's
resources. R. 186 at 13, 15.
Despite disagreements over his mother's care, Mr. Homeyer did not transfer
Ms. Cannatella to a different rehabilitation facility. Instead, he left her at St. Joseph's
and simply refused to pay for her care and medical bills. R. 186 at 4-5, 13, 15-16. As a
result, on or about October 4, 2002, St. Joseph's brought an action against Ms. Cannatella
in the Third District Court, No. 020910515 (hereafter the "collection action") to collect
over $90,000 in unpaid medical bills. See R. 35; 186 at 4-5. Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki
was assigned to the case and Mr. Homeyer was appointed Ms. Cannatella's guardian
ad litem to represent her interests in that litigation. R. 185 at 2-3; 186 at 4-6. Almost a
year later - with Mr. Homeyer having done nothing to defend the case and, indeed, after
a certificate of default had already been entered - Mr. Homeyer retained attorney Michael
A. Jensen to represent his mother's interests. R. 186 at 5. Without a reed disagreement
that Ms. Cannatella actually owed St. Joseph's the amounts claimed, judgment was
entered against her. R. 186 at 5.
The collection court authorized St. Joseph's to terminate Ms. Cannatella's
residency (R. 186 at 9) and ordered Mr. Homeyer to find another care center for his
mother, but Mr. Homeyer did not and would not comply. R. 185 at 3; 186 at 6, 14.
Mr. Jensen then withdrew as counsel. R. 186 at 5. At a hearing on April 15, 2004,
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Mr. Homey er stated that a year and a half earlier he had unsuccessfully attempted to find
another facility, but gave no indication of further efforts or that he currently had anything
in mind. R. 186 at 14. Further, Mr. Homey er was again failing to make payments for his
mother's care. R. 186 at 5.
With Mr. Homeyer doing nothing and Ms. Cannatella in a state of "limbo" (R. 185
at 3), St. Joseph's went to the office of the public guardian for assistance. The public
guardian in turn contacted Dr. Lois Brandriet of ElderCare Consult, Inc. and appellee
Stagg & Associates and requested that they act as Ms. Cannatella's guardian and
conservator, respectively. R. 186 at 6. ElderCare and Stagg & Associates retained
Mr. Jensen, who focuses his practice on elder law.
2.

Appointment of a Guardian and Conservator - the April 15, 2004 Hearing.

The facts directly relevant to this appeal began on January 6, 2004 with the filing
of a petition to appoint ElderCare as guardian and Stagg & Associates as conservator for
Ms. Cannatella. R. 1-3. At a hearing on January 28, 2004 before Probate Judge
Maughan, Mr. Homeyer appeared and objected to the petition on the ground that he was
her "guardian" and only living relative. R. 185 4-5. He asserted that Mr. Jensen, who
had filed the petition on behalf of ElderCare and Stagg & Associates, had a conflict of
interest because of his representation of Ms. Cannatella in the prior collection action.
R. 185 at 5. Mr. Homeyer also argued that his mother was "not that incapacitated"
(R. 185 at 5), a position directly at odds with her doctor's professional evaluation (R, 16).
Because the petition was opposed, Judge Maughan cut the hearing short and referred the

9

matter to Judge Lewis, the trial judge, without making any substantive rulings on the
issues Mr. Homeyer raised. R. 17; 185 at 3-4, 6.
On about March 8, 2004, St. Joseph's moved the collection court to remove
Mr. Homeyer as his mother's guardian ad litem and to appoint in his stead Dr. Lois
Brandriet, president of ElderCare. R. 25. Judge Iwasaki granted the motion on
March 16, 2004. R. 24. This terminated any possible argument that Mr. Homeyer was
legally his mother's guardian.
On April 15, 2004, Judge Lewis held a hearing on the petition. R. 33; 186.
Mistakenly thinking that Mr. Jensen was representing St. Joseph's and thus had a conflict
of interest, Mr. Homeyer soon objected to Mr. Jensen's participation. R. 186 at 3-4.
However, Mr. Jensen clarified that he was representing the petitioners and explained that
there was no conflict of interest because in both the collection case and this case he was
representing the interests of Ms. Cannatella. R. 186 at 4-5. Judge Lewis also asked
questions of counsel that established the absence of any conflict. R. 186 at 9 (court
clarifying that Mr. Jensen and counsel for St. Joseph's "represent independent clients and
have independent interests here although they may overlap").
Mr. Jensen informed the court that "Ms. Cannatella's bank accounts have been
cleaned out in the last few months," which raised the issue of whether she could rely on
Medicaid to fund her care. R. 186 at 7. Tom Christensen, appointed counsel for
Ms. Cannatella for purposes of the guardianship proceeding, spoke in support of the
petition. R. 186 at 10-11. Although he had not filed a formal objection (R. 19),
Mr. Homeyer was allowed to speak at length against the petition. He asserted that
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Ms. Cannatella had not received proper care; sought to justify his refusal to pay the bills
for her care and his failure to place her in an alternative facility as ordered by the
collection court; argued that he should be Ms. Cannatella's guardian; and accused
St. Joseph's of trying to take "the last penny that she has" and of taking all of
Ms. Cannatella's assets. R. 186 at 11-18. Mr. Homeyer's accusation that St. Joseph's
had cleaned out his mother's assets was a patent misrepresentation: as conclusively
established in a subsequent hearing, it was Mr. Homeyer, not St. Joseph's, who had taken
the last of Ms. Cannatella's assets so as to purchase a house for himself. R. 73-78.
At the close of the hearing, the court granted the petition. R. 186 at 18; see R. 3336 (order). Judge Lewis noted for the record that Mr. Homey er "ha[d] been abusive to
my clerk on the phone and had difficulty communicating with her, hanging up on her,
making it almost impossible for her to communicate with him", something the Judge
herself had "experienced . . . today in court" with Mr. Homeyer. R. 186 at 19.
3.

Order for an Accounting and Return of Cannatella's Funds.

Shortly after the hearing, Mr. Jensen, on behalf of the Conservator, subpoenaed
two years of Ms. Cannatella's bank records. R. 187 at 4-5. Analysis of the records
revealed that approximately $75,000 had been removed from one of Ms. Cannatella's
bank accounts on November 13, 2003, and that $7,746 had been removed from another
account on January 22, 2004. R. 74; 187 at 5. Only two persons - Ms. Cannatella (then
incapacitated) and Mr. Homeyer - had access to those accounts. Id.
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After making this discovery, the Conservator successfully applied for Medicaid
support to help ensure Ms. Cannatella's long-term care.5 R. 74. Then, on May 13, 2004,
the Conservator filed a motion for an order requiring Mr. Homeyer to provide an
accounting of his mother's funds for the period of April 1, 2002 through April 30, 2004,
and to turn over any such funds in his possession or under his control.6 R. 41-44.
Mr. Homeyer was served with the motion and the proposed order via mail on May 12,
2004. R. 44, 48. Mr. Homeyer did not file a response and, on June 9, 2004, the court
granted the motion and entered the order. R. 49-52. The June 9 order required
Mr. Homeyer to provide the accounting no later than June 15, 2004 and to turn over all of
his mother's funds no later than five business days following service. R. 51-52. It also
5

Ms. Cannatella met the eligibility requirements for Medicaid only because the
Conservator convinced Medicaid that her assets had been converted, not gifted. Utah's
regulations governing Medicaid eligibility preclude a person from transferring away her
assets and then going on Medicaid. When a person applies for Institutional Medicaid, a
"look-back period" of 36 months for transfers is established such that any transfers to a
third party within 36 months of the application will subject the applicant to sanctions.
See Medicaid Program Standards (Utah Department of Health Services), Vol. III-M
(hereafter "MPS") § 575(4)(B). The number of months a person is ineligible to receive
Medicaid is computed by dividing the value of the asset transferred by the private-pay
rate for Medicaid in effect at the time of the transfer. MPS § 575(4)(B)(5). Here,
Mr. Homeyer alleges that his mother wanted to transfer to him approximately $116,000.
With a private-pay rate at the time of $3118, if she had indeed intentionally transferred
that amount, Ms. Cannatella would have been rendered destitute and ineligible for
Medicaid assistance for approximately 37 months. Given her every advanced age and
medical conditions, she probably would have died long before the sanction period ended.
6
The district court had jurisdiction over Mr. Homeyer. He had already voluntarily
appeared before the court in two prior hearings regarding his mother and had been both
his mother's guardian ad litem and her agent under the power of attorney. Moreover,
under Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-302, "the [district] court has jurisdiction over all subject
matter relating to the .. . protection of... incapacitated persons," including "full power
to make orders, judgments, and decrees and take all other action necessary and proper to
administer justice in the matters which come before it." See also id. § 75-5-433 (court
has authority to order person who conceals, embezzles, or conveys away any of the
money of the ward or protected person to turn over such funds to the conservator).
12

provided that "[s]ervice [of the signed order] on Mr. Homeyer may be made by first class
US Mail." R. 52.
In the past, Mr. Homeyer had repeatedly refused to accept service of documents
by U.S. mail. Despite the court's rejection at the April 15 hearing of his allegations of a
conflict of interest, and despite the obvious fact that Mr. Jensen now represented his
mother's guardian and conservator, Mr. Homeyer still would not open mail of any sort
from Mr. Jensen. R. 74-75; 187 at 24-25. He also refused to accept certified mail from
the Conservator even when the mail contained no indication it was from Mr. Jensen.
R. 74-75; 187 at 25. Thus, to ensure that he received the signed order, Mr. Jensen
decided also to serve it on Mr. Homeyer by constable.7 This occurred on July 7, 2004.
R. 54-56. Mr. Homeyer tried to return the document to the constable, but he apparently
refused to take it back. R. 47.
Nevertheless, as the trial court expressly found, it is clear that Mr. Homeyer was
aware of the court's order and had the ability to provide some sort of accounting and to
turn over his mother's funds or their proceeds - he merely refused to do so. R. 187 at 51.
Although the due date for the accounting (though not the turn over of funds) had passed
by the time Mr. Homeyer could be served in person by the constable, there is no evidence

Although the record shows that Mr. Homeyer was served via mail with the proposed
order on May 12, 2004, for some reason the record does not contain a certificate of
service indicating that the signed order was mailed to Mr. Homeyer. Nevertheless, for
the Court's information, Mr. Jensen attests that he did indeed mail a copy of the signed
order to Mr. Homeyer on or about June 9 as 23ly permitted by the order itself, and then
also effected service by constable to be certain that notice was not an issue. Of course,
since Mr. Homeyer refused to open any mail from Mr. Jensen, he did not see the signed
order until the constable presented it to him on July 7.
n

he made the slightest effort to comply with the court's order or to call the court or
Mr. Jensen for a clarification or extension of the deadlines. He simply ignored the order.
4.

Order to Show Cause and the August 11, 2004 Hearing.

The district court and the Conservator allowed Mr. Homeyer ample time to
comply with the order to provide an accounting and turn over Ms. Cannatella's funds.
Not until July 21, 2004 - fourteen days after Mr. Homeyer had been served by the
constable with the signed order, over five weeks since service of the signed order by
mail, and over two months since service of the identical proposed order - did the
Conservator file and serve a motion for an order to show cause why Mr. Homeyer should
not be held in contempt for failing to comply with the court's order. R. 57-61. The
district court issued the order the same day. R. 57-61. The order provided:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Gerald Homeyer appear before this
Court on the 10th day of August 2004, at the hour of 2:00 p.m. to show why
he should not be held in contempt of this Court's Order served on him by
constable on July 7, 2004, because of his failure to provide an accounting
of his mother's funds for the period April 1, 2002 through April 30, 2004,
and for his failure to turn over all of his mother's funds in his possession or
under his control. [R. 67-68.]
On July 29, the constable served the order on Mr. Homeyer. R. 66.
Mr. Homeyer appeared at the hearing on August 11, 2004 (postponed a day
because Judge Lewis was sick) and spoke on his own behalf R. 187, passim. The issue
of his failure to provide an accounting was addressed. The court first cleared up
Mr. Homeyer's misconception that, despite the court's order, he was somehow legally

14

exempt from providing an accounting. R. 187 at 9-11. When the court then asked if he
was "willing to file an accounting," Mr. Homeyer responded that he "ha[d] no
information to file an accounting with" and that he could not assemble such information
because "none of those records are available to [him]." R. 187 at 11. Contrary to
Mr. Homeyer's suggestion on appeal (see Brf. Applt. at 9), Mr. Homeyer was not merely
stating that he didn't have records with him at the hearing, much less implying that had
he been given better notice of the scope of the hearing he would have produced the
necessary documents. Quite the contrary, he was stating the simple fact that he did not
have such records because "all those records ha[d] been destroyed" by him "at least 6 - 8
months ago or more when the FCannatella] accounts were closed."9 R. 187 at 12, 13; see
R. 77 (court's findings of fact; stating that Homeyer destroyed financial records). Indeed,
at no time did Mr. Homeyer object or complain that the subject matter or scope of the

Mr. Homeyer claimed that in the earlier collection action Mr. Jensen had informed him
that he was not legally obligated to give an accounting. That was legally correct with
respect to St. Joseph's, since (absent a court order) Mr. Homeyer did not owe that
institution any sort of duty to account for his use of the power of attorney. But
Mr. Jensen never suggested that Mr. Homeyer would be exempt from providing an
accounting when ordered by a court to do so. Moreover, under the power of attorney that
Mr. Homeyer had used to manage his mother's financial affairs, it expressly states that he
"shall provide an accounting for all funds handled and all acts performed as my Agent, if
I so request or if such a request is made by any authorized personal representative or
fiduciary acting on my behalf." R. 72, Exhibit 6 at 2; see also R. 77 (finding of fact that
that power of attorney required Mr. Homeyer to provide an accounting); see Utah Code
Ann. § 75-5-501(5) (power of attorney statute requires agent to give accounting to
principle's conservator). Mr. Jensen never suggested to Mr. Homeyer that he would be
exempt from this duty.
9
At the hearing, Mr. Homeyer claimed that the reason he had no records was that during
the collection action Mr. Jensen had advised him to destroy them. This allegation is both
false and absurd. Mr. Jensen, who is co-counsel on this brief and an elder law attorney
with a spotless reputation, categorically denies that he ever advised Mr. Homeyer to
destroy any records associated with Ms. Cannatella.
1S

hearing exceeded the notice he had been given or that he had been denied due process or
a fair opportunity to present his side of the story.
After ordering Mr. Homeyer to open all mail from Mr. Jensen (R. 187 at 15), the
court next turned to whether Mr. Homeyer had failed to return Cannatella funds in his
possession or under his control - that is, whether he had such funds to begin with. See
R. 187 at 15-16. Mr. Homeyer asserted that "the only thing they're [i.e., the conservator]
trying to do is take every last nickel [Ms. Cannatella] has and put her in poverty." R. 187
at 15. However, the evidence presented at the hearing proved precisely the opposite: that
it was Mr. Homeyer who had plundered Ms. Cannatella's assets for his own benefit.
Through clear and convincing evidence - most of which Mr. Homeyer frankly conceded
- it was established that Mr. Homeyer took tens of thousands of dollars from his mother's
accounts and used such funds for his own ends rather than to provide for her care.
Mr. Homeyer expressly admits as much on appeal. Brf. Applt. at 8.
To summarize the evidence: Mr. Homeyer admitted, and the financial records
established, that he had endorsed three checks from U.S. Bank consisting of the proceeds
of three of Ms. Cannatella's CDs. R. 72, Exhibit 2 (checks); 75; 187 at 29-34. Two of
these checks were dated November 13, 2003 and had a combined total of $74,937.21. Id.
Another, dated January 22, 2004, was for $7,746.05. Id. Through documents and
admissions by Mr. Homeyer, it was established that these checks from Ms. Cannatella's
accounts at U.S. Bank were then deposited into one of Mr. Homeyer's personal accounts
at Deseret First Credit Union. R. 76; 187 at 29-34. Mr. Homeyer was also shown a copy
of a check issued from Ms. Cannatella's account at the Emigrant Savings Bank in
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New York in the amount of $9,900. R. 72, Exhibit 4. He admitted that he had endorsed
the check and obtained Ms. Cannatella's funds through the power of attorney. R. 76; 187
at 36-37. On November 6, 2003, Mr. Homeyer deposited this check into one of his
accounts at Deseret First Credit Union. IdL
Mr. Homeyer was also shown copies of several checks representing monthly
Social Security benefits for Ms. Cannatella and pension benefits from Unite National
Retirement Fund. R. 72, Exhibit 1; 76; 187 at 26-28. The monthly amounts for such
benefits are $852 from Social Security and $112.50 from United National Retirement
Fund. Id. Mr. Homeyer admitted that he had either deposited these amounts into his own
account or that they were directly deposited into his or his mother's accounts. Id.
Mr. Homeyer admitted that he never used any of his mother's savings to pay
St. Joseph for her care. R. 76; 187 at 28, 37. He did claim that he had used some of his
mother's funds for her benefit in the form of storage fees for her personal property.
R. 77; 187 at 37-38. Mr. Homeyer also claimed he had made other payments on his
mother's behalf, but he could not provide any specific information or details. R. 77; 187
at 38-39. Because Mr. Homeyer's actions have rendered his mother impecunious,
Medicaid funds are currently paying to support her and provide for her medical care at
St. Joseph's. R. 76.
It is undisputed that Mr. Homeyer used his mother's money for his own purposes.
On or about April 15, 2004, Mr. Homeyer purchased a new house in Riverton, Utah.
R. 77; 187 at 33-34. Mr. Homeyer used Ms. Cannatella's funds for an $83,000 down
payment on the house and to pay $1,916.82 in closing costs. R. 77; 187 at 34. Despite
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purchasing the house with his mother's funds, Mr. Homeyer put the house solely in his
own name; Ms. Cannatella had no ownership interest whatsoever in it. R. 77; 187 at 34.
After the court compelled him to testify on the issue, Mr. Homeyer's sole
explanation for why he had liquidated his mother's assets was that it was by her verbal
"consent." R. 187 at 33-35. Mr. Homeyer admitted "there is no physical evidence" that
his mother gifted the money to him - no document or instrument evidencing the gift.
R. 187 at 35. Indeed, he failed to identify any corroborating evidence whatsoever. He
simply stated that prior to purchasing the house he had several "conversations" with his
mother where she had indicated "her desire that [ h e ] . . . purchase another house."
R. 187 at 35.
Having heard the evidence, which established that Mr. Homeyer had made no
effort to provide an accounting and that he had failed to turn over funds which he had
taken from his mother for his own use, the district court held him in contempt and
sentenced him to immediately serve 30 days in jail. The court ruled:
THE COURT: It's crystal clear that an accounting is required. I
ordered an accounting. Mr. Homeyer was aware of the Court's order.
It is this court's finding that he not only had knowledge of an
existing court order to turn over the funds and to provide an accounting and
could have done so, had the ability to provide an accounting and turn over
the funds and chose not to do so, failed to comply with the Court's order so
I'm finding him to be in contempt and I'm ordering him to provide the
accounting, do what he needs to do and I'm also ordering him to do 30 days
in jail forthwith.
Counsel, I'm going to ask you, Mr. Jensen, to prepare findings
consistent with the testimony today. The sums alluded to in the Exhibits
were taken by Mr. Homeyer for his personal use. That there's no document
showing that he had anybody's permission to take all of this money and
treat it as his own, leaving his mother without any resources for her own
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care. In fact the one document he alludes to, the power of attorney, makes
it clear that he had a duty of accountability.
He didn't even put his home in joint tenancy and he acknowledged
that today. And then you may take a judgment for the money due on it.
R. 187 at 51.
5.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment and
Withdrawn Post-Judgment Motion.

In accordance with the court's directions, Mr. Jensen prepared and submitted a
(proposed) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Order to Show Cause, which was
served on Mr. Homeyer on August 16, 2004. R. 80. Mr. Homeyer was in jail at the time
serving his 30-day sentence, which had begun on August 11. However, the district court
delayed in entering it until September 23, 2004, which gave Mr. Homeyer nearly two
weeks post-incarceration to file any objection. See R. 73. No objection was filed.
The court found "[b]y clear and convincing evidence" that uMr. Homeyer had
used his mother's funds for his own benefit, leaving Ms. Cannatella without any assets to
pay for her long-term care. Without such assets, Medicaid funds are now supporting
Ms. Cannatella while Mr. Homeyer enjoyed ownership of a new home paid for solely
from his mother's funds." R. 78. The court also found, "[b]y clear and convincing
evidence," that Mr. Homeyer "had (a) knowledge of this Court's Order; (b) knowledge
and possession of Ms. Cannatella's funds; (c) the capacity and ability to provide an
accounting; and (d) the capacity and ability to turn over his mother's funds." R. 78. The
court restated its conclusions regarding contempt and ruled that a judgment against
Mr. Homeyer for the amount of his mother's funds would be proper. R. 78. The court's
June 9 order had already mandated that Mr. Homeyer turn over all his mother's funds.
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The undisputed evidence and Mr. Homeyer's admissions at the August 11 hearing
conclusively established the amount he needed to turn over so there was nothing left to
determine.
On September 23, 2004, the district court entered an Order and Judgment against
Mr. Homeyer in the amount of $116,181.26, which represented the amount of funds he
had taken from his mother.10 R. 81-82. The Order and Judgment also permitted
Mr. Homeyer to offset any documented amounts he had used for the benefit of
Ms. Cannatella. R. 82.
On October 6, 2004, the Conservator filed a motion for an order requiring
Mr. Homeyer to convey real property, purchased in part with Ms. Cannatella's converted
funds, to Ms. Cannatella. R. 86-92. Now represented by counsel, on October 22, 2004,
Mr. Homeyer filed an opposition to that motion. R. 108-10. On the same day,
Mr. Homeyer also filed (1) a Rule 62 request for stay of proceedings to enforce judgment
(R. 118-20); and (2) a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment or order, with
supporting memorandum, in which he raised essentially the same due process arguments
now presented on appeal. R. 121-28.
However, on November 1, 2004 - before the Conservator could file an opposition
or reply to these documents - Mr. Homeyer withdrew his Rule 60(b) motion, his
opposition to the motion to convey Mr. Homeyer's property to Ms. Cannatella, and his
request for stay of proceedings to enforce the judgment. R. 159-61. Accordingly, the
10

Based on the evidence from the hearing, the total consisted of $82,683.26 in liquidated
CDs from U.S. Bank; $9,900 from an account at Emigrant Savings Bank; $20,448 for 24
months of Social Security checks; and $3,150 for 28 months of Unite National
Retirement Fund checks. R. 82.
20

trial court never had the opportunity to review or rule on Mr. Homeyer's due process
arguments. Instead, Mr. Homey er sought to pursue this appeal.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Homey er's appeal should be rejected. He failed to properly preserve his due
process issue in the district court despite ample opportunities to do so. Never once, even
after retaining legal counsel, did he present his due process concerns to the district court.
Under these circumstances, it is well established that he cannot raise that issue for the
first time on appeal. At any rate, the hearing on the order to show cause did not violate
Mr. Homey er's due process rights. He received timely and adequate notice of the date,
time, place, and subject matter of the order to show cause hearing. At the hearing itself,
the district court properly conducted an inquiry into those factual issues that were
necessary to determine (1) whether Mr. Homey er was in contempt of the court's order to
account for and turn over his mother's funds, and (2) if so, how severe his sanction
should be. The undisputed evidence and Mr. Homey er's own admissions clearly and
convincingly established not only that he had failed to provide the mandated accounting,
but that he had also taken his mother's funds for his own purposes and then refused to
return them as the court had ordered. The court's findings on these issues in no way
violated Mr. Homey er's due process rights, and nothing would be served by a remand to
the district court.
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ARGUMENT
L

Mr. Homeyer's Due Process Arguments Were Not Properly Preserved and
Thus May Not Be Considered on Appeal.
Mr. Homeyer has raised a single issue on appeal - whether "the trial court

deprive[ed] [him] of due process of law" when, on August 11, 2004, it allegedly "[held]
an evidentiary and adversarial hearing on the merits" rather than confining itself to the
contempt issue. Brf. Applt. at 1. However, Mr. Homeyer failed to raise this issue in the
district court, both at the August 11 hearing and subsequently. Because Mr. Homeyer did
not properly preserve the due process issue in the trial court, and because the "plain
error" exception to the preservation rule does not apply in this case, this Court should
hold that the issue is waived and dismiss the appeal.
A.

Absent Plain Error or Exceptional Circumstances, Failure to Raise an
Issue in the Trial Court Waives that Issue for Purposes of Appeal.

It is a basic rule of appellate practice that "'appellate courts will not consider an
issue, including a constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the
trial court committed plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances.'"
Groberg v. Housing Opportunities, Inc., 2003 UT App 67, ^ 11, 68 P.3d 1015 (quoting
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993)).11
This Court recently summarized how an issue may be properly preserved for
appeal and the policy reasons for requiring preservation in the trial court:
11

See also Espinal v. City Board of Education, 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990) ( "With
limited exceptions, the practice of this court has been to decline consideration of issues
raised for the first time on appeal."); US Xpress, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 886
P.2d 1115,119 (Utah App. 1994) ("It is well settled that, absent extraordinary
circumstances or plain error, issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.");
Progressive Acquisition, Inc. v. Lytle, 806 P.2d 239, 242 (Utah App.1991) ("axiomatic"
that claims not before trial court may not be advanced for first time on appeal).
22

In order to preserve an issue for appeal, it "must be raised in a timely
fashion, must be specifically raised such that the issue is sufficiently raised
to a level of consciousness before the trial court, and must be supported by
evidence or relevant legal authority." State v. Schultz, 2002 UT App 366,
1j 19, 58 P.3d 879 (quotations and citations omitted). "The trial court is
considered 'the proper forum in which to commence thoughtful and
probing analysis' of issues." Brown, 856 P.2d at 360 (citation omitted).
The preservation rule allows "the trial court an opportunity to 'address the
claimed error, and if appropriate, correct it."5 State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37,
1j10, 46 P.3d 230 (quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11, 10 P.3d
346). Additionally, "[f]ailing to argue an issue and present pertinent
evidence in that forum denies the trial court 'the opportunity to make any
findings of fact or conclusions of law' pertinent to the claimed error."
Brown, 856 P.2d at 360 (citation omitted).
State v. Richins, 2004 UT App 36, ^ 8, 86 P.3d 759 (emphasis added); State v. Steggell,
660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983) (to preserve a procedural issue for appeal, a party must
raise a "timely and proper objection . . . in the trial court").
Failure to properly preserve an issue for appeal almost always results in waiver.
In State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 853-54 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court held that
issues raised for the first time on appeal may be addressed only if the trial court
proceedings demonstrated "plain error." See also US Express, Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Commission, 886 P.2d 1115,1119 (Utah App. 1994) ("It is well established that, absent
extraordinary circumstances or plain error, issues cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal."). The plain error standard is very difficult to satisfy.
Plain error will be found only if the appellate court determines that (1) the
error "should have been obvious to a trial court ... [; and (2) ] the error must
be harmful in that it affects the substantial rights of the accused." [Citing
State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992).] The plain error exception acts
as "a safety device to make certain that manifest injustice does not result
from the failure to consider an issue on appeal." State v. Archambeau, 820
P.2d 920, 923 (Utah App. 1991).
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Brown. 856 P.2d at 363 (emphasis added). As this Court noted in Davis v. Grand County
Service Area. 905 P.2d 888, 892 n.8 (Utah App. 1995), the plain error standard is even
"more rigorous than the abuse-of-discretion standard". Not surprisingly, cases where this
Court has found plain error as an exception to waiver have been rare. Typically, Utah
appellate courts hold that failure to preserve an issue in the trial court precludes
consideration on appeal. See, e.g.. Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320, 1323 (Utah 1982)
(The Utah Supreme Court "has repeatedly stated that an issue which has not been raised
in the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.").
These preservation standards apply even when someone, like Mr. Homeyer,
chooses to represent himself in the trial court. "As a general rule, a party who represents
himself will be held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified
member of the bar."12 Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983) (citations
omitted). See also Wurst v. Dept. of Employment Security. 818 P.2d 1036, 1213 n.3
(Utah App. 1991) (same). The fact that Mr. Homeyer chose to appear pro se at the
contempt hearing and elected not to retain legal counsel until after the district court had
entered judgment does not entitle him to any special indulgences on the preservation
question. As the Oregon Court of Appeals succinctly put it, "pro se litigants are bound

12

To be sure, "a layperson acting as his or her own attorney 'should be accorded every
consideration that may reasonably be indulged'" in the trial court. Wurst. 818 P.2d at
1213 n.3 (quoting Nelson. 669 P.2d at 1213). But that does not mean that the trial court
is required to help the pro se party prosecute his case or preserve his defenses. The Utah
Supreme Court stated in Nelson that "[Reasonable consideration for a layman acting as
his own attorney does not require the court to interrupt the course of proceedings to
translate legal terms, explain legal rules, or otherwise attempt to redress the ongoing
consequences of the party's decision to function in a capacity for which he is not
trained." Nelson. 669 P.2d at 1213.
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by the same preservation rules that bind all other parties." State v. Morrow, 86 P.3d 70
(Or. App. 2004) (finding waiver). Hence, in a case analogous to this one, the Utah
Supreme Court in Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1323 (Utah 1982), held that it
would not consider a pro se party's due process challenge to a contempt ruling where the
party had failed to raise the issue ("a request to confront a witness") "at the order to show
cause hearing" in the trial court.
B.

Mr. Homeyer Did Not Preserve the Due Process Issue in the District
Court.

Mr. Homeyer complains that the district court denied him due process at the
August 11 contempt hearing. But never once at that hearing, or even after, did he make a
due process objection to any part of the proceeding or to the sufficiency of the notice.
Although not challenged on appeal, the same is true of the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and the Order and Judgment. That is, Mr. Homeyer did not present
the due process issue (by name or otherwise) to the district court in any specific way.
To be sure, after the judgment had been entered, Mr. Homeyer retained legal
counsel who filed several documents, including a Rule 60(b) motion, that expressly
raised due process concerns. Hence, there is no question Mr. Homeyer became fully
aware of the due process issue while there was still time to present it to the district court.
Indeed, that appeared to be a principal purpose of his post-judgment filings, especially his
Rule 60(b) motion. See R. 121-58. But Mr. Homeyer chose to withdraw his motion and
objections before the Conservator could respond and before the district court could
consider the issue and correct whatever error it allegedly made.

OS

In short, Mr. Homeyer's due process arguments were never presented for
consideration to the district court and thus he has waived his right to appellate review of
that issue. Again, Mr. Homeyer is not entitled to any special concessions or to a more
lenient standard because he chose not to retain an attorney until late in the case; and
particularly not when, after retaining legal counsel, he intentionally withdrew the due
process issue from the district court's consideration after initiating efforts to raise it. Cf.
Burgers, 652 P.2d at 1322-23 (pro se party's belated due process objection to contempt
proceeding not presented to the district court and thus waived on appeal).
Not only did Mr. Homeyer not make a formal due process objection, he never
even complained about the August 11 hearing or the hearing notice until this appeal. In
his opening brief, Mr. Homeyer maintains that at the hearing he told the court he had not
come prepared with financial documents or to answer questions about finances (Brf.
Applt. at 9 & 17), as if that alone were enough to preserve a due process issue for appeal.
They are not.
But even granting a generous construction, such statements are irrelevant to the
preservation issue here. The issue Mr. Homeyer seeks to raise on appeal is whether the
district court exceeded the proper scope of the August 11 contempt hearing by allegedly
''holding an evidentiary and adversarial hearing on the merits," i.e., on whether
Mr. Homeyer had illicitly taken his mother's money, rather than just addressing the
narrow issue of contempt. Brf. Applt. at 1. But not once at the August 11 hearing did
Mr. Homeyer make the slightest objection to the scope of the hearing or the court's
substantive inquiry into how much money he had taken from his mother and whether that
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was proper. Nor did he claim at the hearing to have any information or documents at
home (or elsewhere) to dispute the Conservator's hard evidence, which mostly consisted
of checks bearing his own signature. In fact, just the opposite is true: Mr. Homeyer
denied having any financial documents to use in preparing an accounting because (as he
testified) he had destroyed them months earlier and couldn't obtain them otherwise from
other institutions. R. 187 at 12, 13; 77. More fundamentally, at the hearing he frankly
admitted taking funds from his mother for his own use, something he also concedes on
appeal. R. 187 at 33-35; Brf. Applt. at 8.
Even on the issue of whether Ms. Cannatella wanted him to have the money - his
sole justification for taking it - Mr. Homeyer testified that the only evidence of that intent
consisted of conversations she had with him in which she allegedly expressed that desire;
he denied there was any documentary evidence. R. 187 at 35. He never so much as
hinted, for instance, that if only he had been given proper notice of the scope of the
hearing he would have been able to produce witnesses to corroborate his story, or even
that there was anyone else who might know of his mother's alleged desires.
Mr. Homeyer gave his testimony regarding his mother's alleged intent without once
suggesting that he had been caught by surprise or was being denied a fair proceeding or
needed additional time to prepare.
As stated earlier, to properly preserve an issue for appeal it "must be raised in a
timely fashion, must be specifically raised such that the issue is sufficiently raised to a
level of consciousness before the trial court, and must be supported by evidence or
relevant legal authority." Schuhz, 2002 UT App, ^ 19. Like the pro se defendant in
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Burgers, 652 P.2d 1320, Mr. Homeyer did not comply with any of these requirements.
The district court was never made aware of potential due process concerns nor allowed
the opportunity to address them. Accordingly, Mr. Homey er waived the due process
issue.
C.

This Appeal Does Not Present an Issue of Plain Error.

The plain error exception to waiver does not apply in this case. To paraphrase this
Court in Brown, no "manifest injustice [will] result from the failure to consider
[Mr. Homey er's due process] issue on appeal." Brown, 856 P.2d at 363. The bottom line
is that Mr. Homeyer admits to using a power of attorney to take his incapacitated
mother's money for his own purposes, which undisputedly left her unable to pay for her
essential care. Requiring him to return money he wrongfully took from his mother, and
to which he had no right in the first place, works no injustice. As the next section
demonstrates, even assuming arguendo a due process error occurred in the August 11
hearing, the error was neither obvious to the district court nor did it abridge
Mr. Homeyer's substantial rights. See id. Mr. Homeyer cannot satisfy the stringent
criteria for plain error.
Mr. Homeyer waived the due process issue and the plain error rule does not apply.
This Court should decline to consider the issue presented on appeal.
II.

In Any Event, Mr. Homeyer's Due Process Rights Were Not Violated at the
August 11 Hearing.
Mr. Homeyer's request for relief neatly illustrates why his due process challenge

is without substance. In his Conclusion, Mr. Homeyer requests that this Court "reverse
the decision of the trial court and remand the matter back to the trial court to allow [him]
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to first prepare, and then and there present evidence concerning the whereabouts of
Ms. Cannatella's funds." Brf. Applt. at 20. But the "whereabouts of Ms. Cannatella's
funds" is undisputed: at the August 11 hearing, Mr. Homey er frankly admitted to taking
the funds and using them for his own ends, including purchasing a new house. R. 187 at
33-35. That fact remains undisputed on appeal. Brf. Applt. at 8 ("Mr. Homey er admitted
to this [i.e., that he "had taken money out of his mother's bank accounts to make a down
payment on a new home in Riverton] . . . . " ) . Thus, Mr. Homeyer seeks a remand so he
can conduct a factual inquiry into undisputed facts that have already been conclusively
established. This makes no sense at all. The heart of due process is fairness. It was
hardly unfair for the district court to take evidence establishing what Mr. Homeyer
himself frankly admits.
In short, it was not a denial of due process when, at the August 11 hearing, the
district court allowed the Conservator to present irrefutable evidence that Mr. Homeyer
had flagrantly violated the court's order by doing nothing to provide an accounting of his
mother's finances and by refusing to return over $100,000 of her money. While all court
orders must be obeyed, it is surely appropriate in a contempt hearing to establish the
nature, magnitude and impact of the disobedience so that the penalty can fit the "crime."
The evidence presented at the August 11 hearing did just that and thus was highly
relevant to the core contempt issue. Mr. Homeyer was not denied due process.
Before addressing Mr. Homeyer's due process arguments, it is important to clarify
what is not at issue in this appeal. Most importantly, Mr. Homeyer has not appealed the
correctness of the district court's contempt sanction and has not challenged in his briefing
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the correctness of the final order and judgment. Nor is he appealing the district court's
refusal to disqualify Mr. Jensen from representing the Conservator.
A.

Fairness Is the Heart of Procedural Due Process.

The Conservator has no quarrel with the basic principles of procedural due process
set out in Mr. Homey er's brief. Brf. Applt. at 12-14. A party is of course entitled to fair
notice of a proceeding and an opportunity to present objections. See Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). No one denies that. But it is also
important to underscore that "due process is not a technical concept that can be reduced
to a formula with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances. Rather, the
demands of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of procedure and demand a
procedure appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved." Nelson v. Jacobsen,
669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Procedural due process focuses not on irrelevant technicalities but on the substantive
fairness of the proceeding.
B.

The District Court Properly Took Evidence at the August 11 Hearing
to Establish the Nature and Extent of Mr. Homeyer's Disobedience to
the Court's June 9 Order.

Mr. Homey er's due process challenge boils down to two closely related
arguments: (1) that the order to show cause itself did not provide adequate notice; and
(2) that the August 11 hearing exceeded the proper scope of a contempt proceeding. Brf.
Applt. at 14-19. Neither argument is valid.
The lead-up to the August 11 hearing shows that Mr. Homeyer had both adequate
notice and time to prepare for the substance of the hearing. The order to show cause
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specifies the date, time, and place of the hearing. R. 67-68. Given the proceedings
leading up to the August 11 hearing, Mr. Homeyer had more than adequate time to
prepare. On May 12, 2004, the Conservator served Mr. Homeyer with the motion for an
order to provide an accounting and turn over all his mother's funds, together with the
proposed order itself. R. 44, 48. Mr. Homeyer did not oppose the motion. The signed
order (dated June 9) was served on him by mail on or about June 9 and then by constable
on July 7. R. 54-55. After Mr. Homeyer failed to comply, the Conservator filed a motion
for an order to show cause, which was served on Mr. Homeyer on July 21. R. 57-61. To
ensure that Mr. Homeyer's stubborn refusal to open mail did not defeat his receiving
notice of the hearing, on July 29 the signed order to show cause was served on him in
person by a constable. R. 57-61, 66. Given all this, Mr. Homeyer had more than enough
time to prepare for the subject matter of the August 11 hearing. For months he had been
receiving notice that he would be required to provide an accounting and to turn over his
mother's funds.
Of course, the fact that Mr. Homeyer chose not to carefully read some of the
foregoing documents (refusing even to accept service from the constable) or to prepare
for the hearing is entirely his own fault and of no consequence in the due process
analysis. C£ Brf. Applt. at 14-15 (asserting that Mr. Homeyer should "be forgiven" for
misunderstanding court documents he refused to fully read and sought to discard). There
is nothing in Utah law suggesting that as a matter of due process Mr. Homeyer should be
shielded from the consequences of his refusal to respect the judicial process. The
decision in Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983), which Mr. Homeyer cites,

says nothing of the sort. To the contrary, Nelson emphasizes that a pro se litigant like
Mr. Homeyer will not be relieved of the "consequences" of his "decision to function in a
capacity for which he is not trained." Id. at 1213.
The order to show cause also gave adequate notice of the nature and purpose of
the hearing: "to show why he should not be held in contempt of this Court's Order
served on him by constable on July 7, 2004, because of his failure to provide an
accounting of his mother's funds for the period April 1, 2002 through April 30, 2004, and
for his failure to turn over all of his mother's funds in his possession or under his
control." R. 67-68. Under Mr. Homeyer's theory, this notice strictly limited the trial
court to inquiring only into whether he had failed to provide an accounting or to turn over
the funds and why, but did not allow for presentation of any evidence regarding which
funds he had failed to turn over and what he had done with them.
But that narrow view makes little sense - especially here - and is not supported by
any precedent that Mr. Homeyer has provided or that the Conservator can find. "As a
general rule, in order to prove contempt for failure to comply with a court order it must
be shown that the person cited for contempt knew what was required, had the ability to
comply, and intentionally failed or refused to do so." Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d
1162, 1172 (Utah 1988). To hold a person in contempt, the trial court must also issue
detailed findings of fact - based on clear and convincing evidence - and conclusions of
law to ensure an appropriate factual and legal justification for the sanction. Id Thus, at
the August 11 hearing the Conservator (who had sought the order to show cause) had the
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burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Homeyer deserved to be
held in contempt.
To do that, counsel for the Conservator introduced extensive evidence - bank
checks bearing Mr. Homeyer's signature, social security checks, bank account histories,
deposit slips (R. 72) - establishing the existence of the precise funds Mr. Homeyer was
required to account for and turn over. Since Mr. Homeyer had been ordered to turn over
"all of his mother's funds," counsel put on evidence of "all" the assets and monies he had
taken from his mother but failed to account for or turn over. Counsel also introduced
evidence of where the money had gone so the court could have a full picture of the
situation. As related above, none of this evidence was disputed - Mr. Homeyer
acknowledged taking the monies, most of which he admitted using for the purchase of a
house solely for himself. R. 187 at 33-35.
All of this evidence was relevant - arguably essential - to establish a clear and
convincing basis for a finding of contempt against Mr. Homeyer. To prove that a person
failed to account for and turn over particular funds it is entirely appropriate to establish
which funds are at issue and their whereabouts; a district court would typically not hold a
person in contempt for failing to turn over funds the person never possessed or controlled
in the first place. Here, the importance of the location and title of such funds was
essential to show that they were in Mr. Homeyer's possession and were not being
properly held for the benefit of his mother. Moreover, such evidence was directly
relevant to how severe a sanction the court should impose. As a matter of due process,
contempt sanctions cannot be excessive. See Department of Registration of Department

of Business Regulation v. Stone, 587 P.2d 137 (Utah 1978) (per curiam). The
egregiousness of Mr. Homeyer's conduct was therefore directly at issue. Obviously,
failure to account for and return $10 is of far less gravity than failing to do so for
$100,000. Establishing just how much of his mother's money Mr. Homeyer had refused
to account for and return was essential to establishing the appropriateness of the stern
30-day jail sentence he received for his contempt of court - a sentence he does not
challenge on appeal.
Mr. Homeyer's complaint that he was unprepared for the scope of the August 11
hearing cannot be taken seriously. As noted already, he had plenty of time to prepare
and, more importantly, the reason he did not bring any relevant financial documents to
the hearing is because he didn't have any; by his own testimony he had destroyed them
many months earlier. R. 77, 187 at 12, 13. In any event, he has never disputed (1) the
accuracy of the documents or testimony that were presented, (2) the factual conclusion
that he took his mother's money, or (3) the amount he took.
At the hearing, the only explanation Mr. Homeyer offered was that it was his
mother's desire that he take her money and buy a house. On appeal, Mr. Homeyer
acknowledges that the court "was free to disbelieve" this excuse and he does not appear
to challenge the fact that it obviously did. See Brf. Applt. at 16. Rather, his argument on
appeal is that "the court went beyond the issue of contempt" and instead addressed "the
specific issue [of] the whereabouts of Ms. Cannatella's funds." Id. at 17. But just to be
clear, Mr. Homeyer's assertion that his mother desired him to take all her money was
objectively unbelievable and irrelevant. While Ms. Cannatella may well have wanted her
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son to inherit her estate and use the money to buy a house, it is utterly implausible to
suggest that she wanted him to take all her money while she yet lived and thus render her
both unable to pay for critical care and unqualified to receive Medicaid funds. See
footnote 55 supra. And even if arguendo she had desired that result, Mr. Homeyer had no
right or authority to comply with it. Ms. Cannatella was incapacitated at the time and
incapable of making such decisions on her own, which was why Judge Iwasaki had
appointed Mr. Homeyer to be her guardian ad litem. See R. 186 at 4-5. While serving as
his mother's agent under the authority of the power of attorney, Mr. Homeyer had a legal
duty to act solely in his mother's best interests. See R. 72, Exhibit 6 at 2
(Cannatella/Homeyer power of attorney: "Agent shall be liable for willful misconduct or
the failure to act in good faith while acting under the authority of this Power of
Attorney."); Compare Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-417 (conservator acts as a fiduciary for the
ward); see e.g.. In re Conant Estate, 343 N.W.2d 593, 595 (Mich. 1984) (power of
attorney creates fiduciary duty). He had absolutely no right to transfer his mother's
money to himself when that was manifestly contrary to her best interests. Taking his
mother's money and leaving her financially destitute was theft, not the result of a lawful
gift. The district court properly rejected Mr. Homeyer's far-fetched excuse for failing to
turn over his mother's funds.
In brief, the evidentiary inquiry the district court conducted at the August 11
show-cause hearing was entirely proper. Mr. Homeyer received timely notice of the
hearing and, furthermore, the subject matter of the hearing was directly related to the
nature and seriousness of Mr. Homeyer's refusal to obey the district court's June 9 order

- the very issue identified in the order to show cause. Mr. Homeyer's due process rights
were not violated at the August 11 hearing.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Homeyer waived the due process issue by not raising it in the district court. In all
events, he received all the process he was due. The proceedings below should be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
Oral argument is requested to assist the Court in addressing the factual and legal
issues presented in this appeal.
DATED this ST& day of July, 2005.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

Alexander DushkiK^
Attorney for Appellee
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